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I. INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) is unwise for sev-
eral reasons, not the least of which is that its reach is ill-defined. To the 
extent that its reach can be predicted, there is either surprisingly little con-
nection between what the amendment will do and the justification offered 
for it or surprisingly little discussion of the breadth of the amendment and 
the effects it likely would have. Several United States Supreme Court cases 
are briefly mentioned below, not to illustrate why such an amendment 
would be unconstitutional, but merely why such an amendment is poorly 
suited to achieve its purported ends and why the purported ends may not 
represent the real ends of the amendment's backers. 
Part II of this paper examines the deceptively simple language of the 
amendment, suggesting that it is open to a variety of interpretations, claims 
to the contrary notwithstanding. Part III suggests that at least one of the 
rationales offered to justify the amendment's passage, namely, promoting 
the interests of children, is undermined rather than promoted by the amend-
ment and thus does not plausibly explain either why the amendment should 
be adopted or even why proponents support its adoption. Part IV discusses 
an interpretation of the amendment which might well be offered by courts 
were the amendment ratified, suggesting that proponents should reconsider 
whether they really would support such a radical change in the current pri-
vacy jurisprudence. The Conclusion of this article suggests that adoption of 
the FMA would be a mistake for a variety of reasons and that those claim-
ing to be interested in promoting the interests of families could better spend 
their time acting in ways which in fact promote rather than undermine those 
very interests. 
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II. WHAT DOES THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT Do? 
While the FMA might seem to be clear, an examination of both the 
language and the various interpretations of it reveal that the language is 
ambiguous in ways that might well be important to those considering 
whether to support it. Consider, for example, the following, which was 
included in the Senate version of the FMA-"Neither this Constitution, nor 
the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or 
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union 
of a man and awoman."l The reach of such a statement is far from clear, 
claims to the contrary notwithstanding.2 
Commentators argue that the statement is clear in that, for example, it 
would preclude any judge from finding same-sex marriages protected by 
the federal or any state constitution.3 Even if that interpretation is correct, 
the question is not whether there is some respect in which the amendment is 
clear but whether it is clear as a general matter with respect to what it 
precludes. For example, it would be important to know what qualifies as an 
incident of marriage if one wishes to figure out what effects the amendment 
might have. Are those incidents to be defined in terms of a particular 
state's law or, instead, is the amendment referring to a particular list of 
benefits including, e.g., the power to have an interest in property owned as a 
tenancy by the entireties?4 If the latter, how are the benefits included on 
that list to be determined? One might, for example, consider which benefits 
are reserved for married couples in all of the states at the time the amend-
ment is passed and designate those as the incidents of marriage. Yet, that 
would yield an empty set, since Vermont does not reserve any benefits 
solely for married couples-couples in civil unions are not married but 
nonetheless have all of the benefits and responsibilities of marriage.5 
The claim here is not that the only or even the best way to determine 
which are the incidents of marriage is to see which benefits are reserved 
exclusively for marital couples-were that the appropriate definition, Ver-
mont citizens and courts might have to be informed of the rather surprising 
news that there are no incidents of marriage in the Green Mountain state.6 
1. See Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Congo (July 7, 2004). 
2. See e.g. 150 Congo Rec. S8061-03 (daily ed. July 14,2004) (written testimony of Teresa 
Collett). 
3. See e.g. id. 
4. See U.S. V. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 280 (2002) ("A tenancy by the entirety is a unique sort of 
concurrent ownership that can only exist between married persons."). 
5. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1204(a) (2005) ("Parties to a civil union shall have all the same 
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administra-
tive or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses 
in a marriage."). 
6. See Lumbra v. Lumbra, 394 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Vt. 1978) (suggesting that "[j]oint custody 
preserves some incidents of the marriage relationship that would be terminated by a decree of sole 
custody with visitation rights"). 
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Yet, if that is not the appropriate criterion, then another one must be 
offered. 
One might suggest that one can determine the incidents of marriage by 
considering what they were at common law. However, that might mean 
that benefits accorded to married couples in some states by statute, for ex-
ample, stepparent adoption rights,7 might not be included. Were one to 
include all of the benefits conferred by statutes, rules,regulations, or the 
common law,s then one would have amassed a large assortment of privi-
leges and benefits for which non-marital couples would presumably have 
no constitutional protection. 
Consider, for example, the right to visit a loved one in an intensive 
care unit.9 Often, visitation privileges are limited to members of the imme-
diate family.lO This would include a spouse, sibling, parent, or child. 
While this benefit is not provided exclusively to spouses, it is one that is 
accorded by virtue of being a spouse and thus on one interpretation might 
be thought an incident of marriage. Yet, if the intent of this amendment 
would be to preclude any and all constitutional protections for the right of 
non-spouses to visit a loved one in an intensive care unit, this might result 
in detriment both to the patient and the would-be visitor and is a heartless 
proposal that should be roundly condemned. 
It simply will not suffice for amendment proponents to suggest that 
even if the amendment would have that result, a legislature could avoid that 
cruel effect by specifying, for example, that non-marital partners might also 
be accorded visitation privileges. There are a variety of reasons that legisla-
tures might not accord such a privilege to non-marital partners, e.g., be-
cause of other priorities or out of the mistaken notion that refusing to do so 
would strengthen rather than undermine families. 
Were the FMA to be adopted, one might expect the following scenario 
to be played out in one or more states. 11 Realizing that hospital visitation is 
7. See Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 8548 (West 2005) ('''Stepparent adoption' means an adop-
tion of a child by a stepparent where one birth parent retains custody and control of the child."). 
8. Cf Vasquez v. N.J. Dept. o/Corrections, 791 A,2d 281, 284 (N.J. Super App. Div. 2002) 
(noting that "marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., 
Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and 
other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children out of wedlock)" and then calling these 
"incidents of marriage"). 
9. Professor Sunstein mentions this example in his testimony. See Sen. Jud. Comm., On 
Amending the Constitution to Define Marriage (Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of Cass R. Sunstein) 
(available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony .cfm ?id= l1l8&wiUd=3l85) (accessed Jan. 8, 
2005). 
10. See Sarah C. Courtman, Student Author, Sweet Lalld 0/ Liberty: The Case against the 
Federal Marriage Amendment, 24 Pace L. Rev. 301,338 (2003) ("Intensive Care Units often limit 
the people who can visit a critically ill person to immediate family."). 
11. Cf Katie Cristol, Vague Law, Certain Discrimination, Cavalier Daily (U. Va.) (Sept. 3, 
2004) (available at 2004 WL 89965243) (discussing "an amendment to the 1997 Marriage Affir-
mation Act, which became law last month, signaling an era of anti-gay discrimination to outrival 
nearly any other state in its antagonism of gays and lesbians"). 
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an incident of marriage and wanting to encourage marriage, legislatures in 
one or more states would pass legislation according some but not other not-
legally-recognized spouses the statutory right to visit loved ones in the hos-
pital. For example, individuals who had made firm wedding plans (accord-
ing to some stated criteria) might be entitled to visit their loved ones in the 
hospital but individuals who had been romantic partners for years, but who 
either could not or would not marry, would not have those same visitation 
rights. 
Suppose that the not-legally-recognized spouses who had no visitation 
rights were to challenge the legislation as a violation of equal protection or 
due process guarantees. Bracketing whether such a challenge would be suc-
cessful on the merits, courts might simply dismiss the challenge by sug-
gesting that interests that might otherwise have been subject to equal 
protection or due process challenge are immune from constitutional scrutiny 
if involving the incidents of marriage. If that is the proper interpretation of 
the amendment, its adoption might well result in needless and undeserved 
pain and suffering. 
Interpretation of the FMA is even more difficult when one considers 
the House version, which states, "Neither this Constitution, nor the constitu-
tion of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that 
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other 
than the union of a man and a woman.'>l2 Some contend that the House bill, 
like the Senate bill, would permit legislatures to recognize civil unions, al-
though others disagree. 13 
Representative Musgrave has reportedly suggested that the House ver-
sion of the amendment would permit a legislature to recognize civil un-
ions-by virtue of the legislature's having accorded those privileges and 
benefits to such unions, they would not be "incidents of marriage" and thus 
would not be subject to the amendment. 14 If that is the correct interpreta-
tion, then "incidents of marriage" refers only to those benefits that are re-
served for marital spouses-privileges to which spouses and others are 
entitled would not count as incidents of marriage and, for example, nothing 
counts as an incident of marriage in Vermont. 15 
Representative Musgrave's view is not persuasive. Indeed, after not-
ing that the term is commonly used by courts, commentators have sug-
gested that the meaning of "incidents of marriage" is clear and 
12. See H.R. Jt. Res. 56 § 1, 108th Congo (May 21, 2003) (emphasis added); a different 
House version mirroring the Senate version was also introduced into the House, see H.R. Jt. Res. 
106 § 2, 108th Congo (Sept. 23, 2004), however, for purposes here, the House version will refer to 
proposed amendment H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Congo at § 1, which includes the italicized words. 
13. See Melissa A. Glidden, Federal Marriage Amendment, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 483, 484 
(2004) (discussing this lack of consensus). 
14. See id. at 484 n. 19. 
15. See vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(a). 
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unambiguous. 16 Yet, courts do not use the term in the way that Representa-
tive Musgrave uses it, and there is cause for grave concern if one of the 
amendment's sponsors does not understand what it means or what it might 
do. 
Courts use the term "incident of marriage" very broadly, often refer-
ring to the benefits or privileges that one acquires by virtue of marryingY 
This usage implies that there are a whole host of benefits that would qualify 
as incidents of marriage, notwithstanding that individuals who are not mar-
ried might also be entitled to them, for example, the hospital visitation 
rights acquired by virtue of being married.18 
The question at hand is whether, according to the House version, such 
rights could also be possessed by others. Would the House version mean 
that because a spouse might have a right to visit someone in the hospital, 
the legislature could not afford such a right to other family members? The 
language of the amendment suggests that a legislature's according the inci-
dents of marriage to a non-spouse would be unenforceable. Because neither 
state nor federal law can be construed to require that the incidents of mar-
riage be afforded to those who are unmarried, a non-spouse who sought to 
enforce her statutorily granted visitation rights might find that courts could 
not construe the statute at issue as having afforded her the contested benefit, 
explicit language conferring such a right notwithstanding. Thus, the amend-
ment might be much more restrictive with respect to the kinds of (enforcea~ 
ble) laws that legislatures might pass than might initially be understood.19 
Perhaps it would be argued that hamstringing legislatures is not the 
intent of the amendment. 20 Yet, this should not provide consolation either to 
the proponents or the opponents of the amendment. First, even if it were 
possible to discern the intent behind the amendment, it is not at all clear that 
the United States Supreme Court would interpret it in light of that inten-
tion?1 Second, given that this amendment not only would have been ap-
proved by two-thirds of the House and Senate, but also by three-quarters of 
16. See Collett, supra n. 2. 
17. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) ("marital status often is a precondition to the 
receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the 
entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born 
out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage ... "). Here, the Court gave a non-exhaustive list of 
the incidents of marriage. See Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536,540 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that the 
list was non-exhaustive). 
18. Sen. Jud. Comm., Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage 
(Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of Cass R. Sunstein) (available at 2004 WL 576635) (wondering 
whether this would affect the right to visit a same-sex partner in a hospital). 
19. See testimony of Robert Bork, 2004 WL 1080321 (F.D.C.H.) (May 13,2004) (suggesting 
that the House version might be thought to mean that legislatures could not pass civil union laws). 
20. [d. ("Critics say that, read literally, the sentence would forbid courts to implement legis-
latively-enacted civil unions. That was not the intent."). 
21. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16-18 
(Princeton U. Press 1997) (suggesting that judges must decide on the basis of what the legislature 
said rather than what it allegedly meant). 
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the states,22 it would seem especially difficult to establish what those voting 
for the amendment had intended. Presumably, some would have voted for 
the amendment even if interpreted as broadly as possible while others 
would have voted for the amendment only if interpreted relatively nar-
rowly?3 It might thus seem difficult to establish the intent of those framing 
and ratifying the amendment except through judicial fiat. 24 
It might be thought that these interpretation difficulties would disap-
pear if only the language of the amendment were clearer. Yet, given the 
Court's interpretation of the language of the Eleventh Amendment, it seems 
clear that amendments may well not be read literally and, further, that the 
Court might claim that those framing and ratifying the amendment intended 
something other than the literal meaning of the text. 25 All of this is to say 
that ultimately the amendment will have to be construed by the courts. In-
sofar as the amendment involves an attempt to prevent "activist" judges 
from working mischief,26 such an ambiguous amendment would seem a 
poor choice for effectuating such a goal. 
A separate issue is whether judges act contrary to their appropriate role 
whenever they issue a decision which might be called "activist." While the 
term "activist" is a dirty word in some lexicons, it can be a term of praise in 
others. For example, Loving v. Virginia27 and Zablocki v. Redhaif8 were 
decisions invalidating state marriage limitations and thus should presuma-
bly be viewed as activist decisions as welL Many who deride "activist" 
judges for recognizing the rights of the lesbianlgay/bisexual/transgender 
(LGBT) community would presumably applaud "activist" judges who rec-
ognize the rights of other groups, e.g., the right of interracial couples,29 the 
indigent, 3D or prisoners31 to marry. At least some individuals who use the 
22. u.s. Const. art. V. 
23. Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) 
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to 
remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the 
spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others 
in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree 
of certainty. 
24. Cf Scalia, supra n. 21, at 18 (suggesting that attempts at discerning intent ultimately 
involve the judge's deciding what the language at issue "ought to mean"). 
25. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 124 S.Ct. 1905, 1909 (2004) ("For over a 
century, however, we have recognized that the States' sovereign immunity is not limited to the 
literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment."). 
26. See e.g. Sen. Jud. Comm., A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Tradi-
tional Marriage (Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of Katherine Shaw Spaht) (available at http://judici-
ary .senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=I118&wiUd=3184) (suggesting that activist judges will 
invalidate traditional marriage laws); H.R. Subcomrn. on Const. of the Jud. Comm., Federal Mar-
riage Amendment (May 13,2004) (testimony of Robert H. Bork) (available at 2004 WL 1080321). 
27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
28. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
29. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. 
30. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374. 
124 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
term "activist" pejoratively, probably do not object so much to activism per 
se as to according members of the LGBT community the particular rights at 
issue. Others might use the term "activist" to describe any judge who is-
sues decisions with which they substantively disagree. 
Presumably, some but not all who criticize the reasoning and result in 
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health32 nonetheless agree with the reasoning 
and result in Loving and Zablocki. Thus, some will criticize all of these as 
"activist" decisions, while others will applaud one or more while criticizing 
one or more on substantive grounds or, perhaps, as examples of judicial 
overreaching. 
In any event, judicial activism is not new33 and, further, may well be 
part of our system. One of the functions of the courts is to protect the rights 
of minorities,34 lack of popUlarity of such a function or those decisions not-
withstanding. Indeed, insofar as the "activism" label is affixed to courts 
whose decisions are not in accord with the general will, e.g., as reflected 
through the laws, the label may merely indicate that the courts are perform-
ing their function. 
Certainly, judges can err and charges of judicial activism are not al-
ways simply reducible to substantive disagreements. That said, however, 
the criterion to determine whether courts are being "activist," where that 
term has a negative connotation, should surely not merely be whether the 
decision is unpopular, but rather whether the decision can be justified in 
light, for example, of the statute at issue, the past decisions in the area, etc. 
Suppose that we could agree about who would qualify as a non-activist 
judge. What would she say about the amendment and its implications for 
one of the paradigmatic examples of an incident of marriage, namely, the 
right to custody or visitation?35 Assuming that either the Senate or the 
House version were adopted, at least one issue would be whether both the 
federal and the state constitutions would cease to protect the parental rights 
of never-been-married parents. 
It is simply unclear how the amendment would be interpreted, but the 
issue raised here should not be dismissed out of hand. After all, the amend-
ment does not only preclude those with a same-sex orientation from having 
31. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 78. 
32. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
33. See William G. Ross, The Resilience of Marbury v. Madison: Why Judicial Review Has 
Survived So Many Attacks, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 733, 785 (2003) (noting that Felix Frankfurter 
and Learned Hand complained about judicial activism before 1937). 
34. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren 
Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361, 1361 (2004) ("Our 
courts were entrusted with the responsibility of judicial review, in large part, to protect individuals 
and minorities in their fundamental rights against abridgement by both government and majori-
ties.") (quoting Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, The Court Sits-In the Center of the Storm, 6 N.Y. 
Times 30 (Nov. 8, 1964). 
35. Cf Lumbra, 394 A.2d at 1142. 
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constitutional protection of certain rights but, instead, seeks to preclude the 
unmarried more generally from having such constitutional protections.36 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has already suggested that mere 
biological connection to a child does not establish parental rights to that 
child, even where those rights and responsibilities are desired?7 The 
amendment at issue here would certainly do nothing to augment the paren-
tal rights of unmarried parents-the issue is only whether such an amend-
ment would do more to undermine those rights. 
The proposed amendment does not mention parental rights explicitly. 
However, there are at least two reasons that this failure to mention such 
rights explicitly should do little to reassure those who would object to a 
constitutional amendment that undermined the parental rights of never-mar-
ried parents.38 First, the amendment explicitly refers to the incidents of 
marriage and since parental rights would seem to be a paradigmatic exam-
ple of an incident of marriage, these rights would seem to be a paradigmatic 
example of what the amendment is addressing. Second, if one considers the 
rationale offered in support of the amendment, namely, promoting the inter-
ests of children,39 two very different analyses of the amendment and its 
proffered justification jump to mind: (1) a non sequitur is being offered to 
justify the adoption of the amendment;40 or (2) those seeking passage of the 
amendment hope to modify the constitutional protections afforded to paren-
tal rights.41 The next two sections deal with each of these possibilities in 
tum. 
III. WHAT Is THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE AMENDMENT? 
Amending the United States Constitution is a difficult process and is 
not to be taken lightly.42 One would expect, then, that the justification for 
the amendment would be very strong, indeed, to warrant such a drastic step. 
Yet, on its face, the justification offered does not plausibly support passage 
36. See Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Congo (July 7, 2004) (suggesting that no state or federal 
constitutional provisions will be construed as requiring that the incidents of marriage be conferred 
upon any non-marital union regardless of whether the individuals involved are of the same sex or 
of different sexes). 
37. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (biological father precluded from blocking 
adoption of his daughter). 
38. A separate issue would be whether the amendment would have implications for the pa-
rental rights of divorced individuals. It is unclear whether they would be thought more like un-
married individuals (because they are not now married and thus, for example, might be raising a 
child alone) or more like married individuals (in that the protected parental rights were created 
during the marriage and would be thought to continue even after the marriage had ended). 
39. See e.g. Shaw SpalIt, supra n. 26 (suggesting that "marriage is about children"). 
40. See infra nn. 49-61 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra nn. 79-82 and accompanying text. 
42. See H.R. Subcomm. on Const. of the Comm. on Jud., Defense of Marriage Act; Gay 
Marriage Amendment (May 13, 2004) (testimony of Jay Sekulow) (available at 2004 WL 
1080324) (amending Constitution not to be taken lightly). 
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of the amendment and indeed makes one wonder whether the proffered rea-
son is the real one. Either a non sequitur has been offered to justify the 
amendment or the amendment is much more robust than anyone seems to 
be suggesting and would really trigger a debate if people understood its 
breadth. 
Consider the reason offered to support the amendment. Proponents 
claim that the amendment is to protect the nation's children.43 Indeed, Pro-
fessor Collett has noted that "we know that children flourish when raised by 
their mother and father united in marriage."44 The difficulty presented is not 
that Professor Collett is incorrect about that, but merely that we also know 
that children are thriving when raised by same-sex parents as well. Child 
rearing experts have noted how well gay and lesbian parents are doing.45 
Commentators may argue about whether same-sex parents are better than, 
as good as, or worse than different-sex parents,46 but that is beside the 
point, since it is of course true that marriage is not reserved only for those 
people who will be the best possible parents. 
Not only is marriage not reserved only for the best possible parents, 
but even adoption is not reserved for the best possible parents, which is 
eminently reasonable given how few adoptions would take place were that 
the criterion employed. In most states, less-than-perfect would-be parents, 
regardless of sexual orientation or marital status, are permitted to adopt 
children, and, as a general matter, children are better off when they are 
adopted-indeed, one of the criteria for approval of adoptions is that the 
child's best interests would thereby be promoted.47 At the risk of stating the 
obvious, children's lives can be improved immensely when they are 
adopted by less-than-perfect parents, whether those adoptive parents have a 
same-sex or a different-sex orientation. 
When determining whether an adoption would indeed promote the in-
terests of the child to be adopted, the standard is not whether the would-be 
43. See e.g. Shaw Spaht, supra n. 26 (suggesting that "marriage is about children"). 
44. See Sen. Jud. Comm., Proposed Constitutioinal Amendment to Preserve Traditional 
Marriage (Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of Teresa Stanton Collett) (available at 2004 WL 576637). 
45. See Mary L. Bonauto, Civil Marriage as a Locus of Civil Rights Struggles, 30 Hum. Rts. 
Q. 3, 7 (2003) (pointing out that "child-rearing experts in the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association . . . point to 
thirty-five years of studies showing that children of gay and lesbian parents are normal and 
healthy on every measure of child development."). 
46. Compare e.g. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Chil-
dren, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 833 (1997) (arguing that same-sex parents are bad for children) with 
Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and 
Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 253 (1998) (arguing that Wardle is incorrect). 
47. See In re Leitch, 732 So.2d 632, 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999) (noting that an "adoption 
should only be granted if it is in the best interest of the child; the best interest of the children is the 
paramount consideration"). 
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adoptive parents are the best possible parents, e.g., are the richest,48 most 
loving parents in the world. That such a standard is not used is quite sensi-
ble if only because the richest, most loving parents in the world might not 
be interested in adopting the child at issue. Rather, what is considered is 
whether this parent or these parents can provide the child with a loving 
home in which the child would flourish even if, for example, there might 
exist other parents who, while not interested in adopting this child, are 
nonetheless in some sense more loving or would be able to provide that 
child with an environment in which she might flourish even more. 
A different way to cash this out is to suggest that when determining 
whether a particular child's best interests would be promoted by being 
adopted by this particular person or these particular persons, the issue is not 
who in some abstract sense would be the best parent but who would be the 
best parent for this particular child. Included within that calculation might 
be a consideration of who already has a positive relationship with that child 
or who is willing to have a positive parent-child relationship with that child. 
Most states do not follow Florida's lead precluding gays and lesbians 
from adopting,49 because they realize that gays and lesbians can provide 
wonderful homes for children who might otherwise be much worse off. 
Further, one might expect those with a same-sex orientation to continue to 
become parents through means other than adoption, e.g., artificial insemina-
tion or surrogacy . Yet, if this is so, there are implications for the 
amendment. 
On one understanding of what the amendment says and does, the pur-
ported justification for its adoption involves a non sequitur. At this mo-
ment, Massachusetts is the only state in which the supreme court of the 
state has held that marriage licenses must be issued to same-sex couples.50 
Yet, gays and lesbians are becoming parents in many states, almost all of 
which preclude them from marrying. There is no reason to think that an 
amendment precluding constitutional protection of marriage would induce 
fewer gays and lesbians to parent. It is thus not at all clear how the pur-
ported justification for the amendment, namely, that the interests of children 
should be protected, provides a reason for the amendment to be adopted. 
Indeed, adoption of the amendment might harm many adults and any 
children whom they might be raising. The adults might be harmed in that 
those who would marry if they could might thereby be denied the benefits 
48. See Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of 
Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 L. & Inequality I, 66 
(1995) (noting the "negative problems associated with childhood poverty"). 
49. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 2004). 
50. See Goodridge, supra n. 32. 
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that they would have derived from marrying.51 The children might be 
harmed in a few different ways. 
Suppose, for example, that marriage adds stability to the family, 
thereby making a more secure environment in which children might be 
raised. By barring same-sex parents from marrying, the amendment might 
be depriving some children of the added stability and security that might 
have been achieved through the marriage of their parents. 
There might be other harms as well, especially if the jurisdiction does 
not permit second-parent adoptions.52 To see why this is so, a little back-
ground about stepparent adoptions may provide needed perspective. 
Stepparent adoptions are the most frequently performed adoptions in 
this country today;53 A paradigmatic example of a stepparent adoption in-
volves the following scenario: An individual with a child from a previous 
marriage remarries. After a few years, the new spouse wishes to adopt the 
child. The former spouse no longer has parental rights, e.g., because of 
death, abandonment, or unfitness. The question is whether the new spouse 
will be able to adopt the child without the biological parent being forced to 
surrender her parental rights. 
Traditionally, whenever a child was adopted, the parental rights of the 
biological parents were terminated. 54 That may have made sense when the 
child was going into a new family.55 However, when the child is going to 
remain with her parent, it obviously would not make sense to require that 
the biological parent surrender her parental rights so that the parent's new 
spouse could be legally recognized as the child's (other) parent. Through 
either statute or case law, states recognized the absurdity of such a result 
and created an exception to the general rule that the biological parents' 
rights would have to be terminated before an adoption could take place. By 
making this exception, states made it possible for stepparents to adopt with-
out their spouses having to surrender their parental rights.56 That way, both 
parents who were raising the child would have parental rights. 
51. "Might" rather than "would" be harmed because even without the amendment same-sex 
couples might not be allowed to marry if the federal Constitution is interpreted as not protecting 
that right, especially in states that have state constitutional provisions declaring such unions void. 
52. See e.g. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002) (holding that Nebraska 
does not recognize second-parent adoptions). 
53. See Ala. Code 1975 § 26-lOA-27 Comment (1975) (noting that stepparent adoptions are 
the most frequently performed type of adoption). 
54. See In re Adoption ofT.K.l., 931 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo. App. 1996) ("[TJhe general rule is 
that a decree of adoption terminates the parental rights and duties of a child's natural parents and 
bestows those rights and duties on the adoptive parent or parents."); see also Humphrey v. Pan-
nell, 710 So.2d 392, 403 (Miss. 1998) (McRae, J., dissenting) (noting that "as a matter of law, a 
decree of adoption terminates the parental rights of the child's biological parents"). 
55. But see Judy E. Nathan, Student Author, Visitation after Adoption: In the Best Interests 
of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 633 (1984) (arguing that visitation between the adopted child and 
her blood relatives promotes her best interests). 
56. See Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 9306(a) (West 2005) ("Except as provided in subdivision (b), 
the birth parents of a person adopted pursuant to this part are, from the time of the adoption, 
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Recently, courts and legislatures have been forced to grapple with a 
related issue. Suppose that two individuals are raising a child together and 
they cannot or will not marry.57 Suppose further that only one of the adults 
is the biological parent of the child. Should the non-biologic ally-related par-
ent be allowed to adopt the child without the biological parent being forced 
to surrender parental rights so that each parent could be legally recognized 
as the parent of the child? Just as is true in the scenario involving a steppar-
ent adoption, the adults in this scenario will be raising the child together so 
it would hardly be sensible to force the biological parent to give up her 
parental rights so that her partner could establish them. 
The benefits that would accrue to the child if both adults were recog-
nized as her parents should not be underestimated. Suppose, for example, 
that two adults are raising a child together and the legal parent dies. The 
child may not only have lost that parent but may also lose contact with the 
other adult who has been functioning as a parent, because the latter may be 
a stranger to the child in the eyes of the law.58 Or, suppose that two unmar-
ried individuals are raising a child together but the couple decides to split 
up. The legal parent may decide to preclude the child from seeing the other 
adult to the child's detriment.59 In both of these kinds of cases, the child 
would have been benefited had her relationship with each of these adults 
been recognized by the law. 
The benefits to the child of having the relationship with the second 
parent legally recognized are not limited to those times when the relation-
ship between the adults ends. Consider two unmarried adults who are rais-
ing a child together. Only one of them is legally recognized as the child's 
parent. Suppose that the non-leg ally-recognized parent is working outside 
of the home. Her employer might well offer insurance or education benefits 
relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted person, and have no 
right over the adopted person."); id. at § 9306(b) ("Where an adult is adopted by the spouse of a 
birth parent, the parental rights and responsibilities of that birth parent are not affected by the 
adoption."); see also Wis. Stat. § 48.835(3)(b) (2004) ("If the person filing the adoption petition is 
a stepparent with whom the child and the child's parent reside, the stepparent shall file only a 
petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent who does not have custody of the child."). 
57. According to the contemporary jurisprudence, both of these individuals would have pa-
rental rights if they were both raising the child and both were biologically related to the child. See 
LehT, 463 U.S. at 262 ("The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural 
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If 
he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he 
may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions 
to the child's development."); but see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (individual 
who is most likely the father of the child at issue denied any parental rights, notwithstanding his 
having had a relationship with her). 
58. Cf Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993) ("[W]hen the functional par-
ents of children born in circumstances similar to Tammy separate or one dies, the children often 
remain in legal limbo for years while their future is disputed in the courts."). 
59. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. App. 1991) (partner could visit 
with children whom she helped to raise with her ex-partner only if her partner, the biological 
parent, consented to the visitation). 
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that would improve the life of the child. However, if the child is not legally 
recognized as a dependent of this worker, the child might not be entitled to 
those benefits. 60 
In some states, second-parent adoptions are permitted and individuals 
who are not married may nonetheless each have a legal relationship with a 
child even when they are not both biologically related to that child.61 In 
those states which do not recognize second-parent adoptions, however, the 
only way that a child in some families might receive the benefits of being 
the legally recognized child of each of her parents is if her parents might 
marry and thus take advantage of the possibility of a stepparent adoption. 
Insofar as the amendment would preclude that option, it might well harm 
rather than help children. 
Some amendment proponents suggest that marriage is for children and 
that this is why the amendment must be adopted.62 Yet, the above suggests 
that promotion of the interests of children is one of the many reasons that 
the amendment should not be adopted. Many non-marital couples, both of 
the same sex and of different sexes, are raising children.63 If marriage pro-
motes the interests of children, then precluding these adults who are raising 
children from marrying64 undermines rather than promotes the interests of 
children. Further, if according some of the incidents of marriage to non-
marital couples might improve the lives of children, then precluding legisla-
tures from according such incidents to non-marital couples might well 
worsen the lives of children. The amendment's supporters seem to be offer-
ing a non sequitur to support their position. 
It might be claimed that the number of same-sex couples who are rais-
ing children is so small that the points here are of mere theoretical interest. 
Yet, such a claim would be mistaken. A large number of children are being 
raised by same-sex parents, a number which has been estimated to be in the 
hundreds of thousands or in the millions.65 
60. Cf Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320 (child would be entitled to receive a variety of 
benefits not otherwise available were she adopted by her mother's same-sex adult partner). 
61. See e.g. id. (recognizing second-parent adoptions); Adoptions of B.L. V.B. and E.L. V.B., 
628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (same); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (same). 
62. See e.g. Shaw Spaht, supra n. 26 (suggesting that "marriage is about children"). 
63. D'Vera Cohn, Live-Ins Almost as Likely as Married to be Parents; Census Looks at Gay 
Households, Washington Post Al (Mar. 13, 2003) ("Unmarried men and women who live to-
gether are nearly as likely as married couples to be raising children, according to a census report 
to be released today."). 
64. See Bork, supra n. 26 (the amendment would prevent federal, state and local govern-
ments from recognizing same-sex marriages.). 
65. See Eileen Ogintz, Go Your Own Way: Extended Family Vacations Come Out of the 
Closet; On Trips for Gay Families, Kids Don't Have to Explain Why They Have Two Mommies or 
Two Daddies, Miami Herald (July 4, 2004) (available at http://www.Miami.comJmidlmiamiher-
ald/living/traveI/9053630.htm?lc) ("More than 2.6 million gay and lesbian households include 
children, and more than 3.1 million children live with gay and lesbian parents, according to a 
report from MarketResearch.com and Witeck-Combs Communications that's based on U.S. Cen-
sus data."). 
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Those children who are being or will be raised by same-sex couples 
provide a compelling reason that this amendment should not be adopted. 
Yet, marriage is not only about children. On the contrary, marriage is also 
about the adults who wish to marry and about other family members as 
welL 
The stereotypical picture of the 1950s' home involved marital partners 
who divvied up responsibilities-one worked outside of the home while the 
other played the predominant role in raising the children.66 That picture 
does not reflect many current American homes.67 For example, many dif-
ferent-sex couples are choosing to be childless.68 Further, many adults are 
caring for their parents,69 and it may well be that same-sex and different-sex 
couples would be benefited were one covered by the other's insurance so 
that he or she could stay home to take care of a parent in need. According 
these incidents of marriage to non-marital couples would not only help the 
parties themselves but might also help other family members and the state, 
for example, by making it possible for elderly relatives to remain with loved 
ones rather than having to go into nursing homes or other facilities. 
As the right-to-marry jurisprudence reveals, marriage is also about the 
relationship between the adults who wish to marry. Consider, for example, 
some of the benefits of marriage described in Turner v. Safiey,70 for exam-
ple, that marriages "are expressions of emotional support and public com-
mitment ... [and can have] spiritual significance.'>7i These interests do not 
depend on whether the couple has or plans to have children. When the 
Griswold Court described marriage as "an association that promotes a way 
of life ... a harmony in living ... [and] a bilateral 10yalty,'n2 it was 
deemphasizing the procreational aspect and instead emphasizing the com-
panionate aspect of marriage. 
The point in mentioning these cases is merely to suggest that people 
marry for a number of legitimate reasons and the reasons that different-sex 
couples marry-love for each other, desire to raise children, etc.-are also 
66. Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J. L. & Pol. 241, 280 n. 129 (1997) ("In traditional family 
working patterns, the husband worked full-time and the wife stayed at home, raising children, 
doing housework and rarely working outside of the home for economic benefit."). 
67. Cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) ("The demographic changes of the past 
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families 
varies greatly from household to household."). 
68. Richard C. Dujardin, 2003 in Religion-A Year of Love and War, Providence J.-Bull. 
DOl (Jan. 3, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 59109320) (noting that "large numbers of married 
couples [are] now choosing to go childless"). 
69. Andrea Petersen, Health Watch: Programs Offer a Breakfor Caregivers, Wall St. J. Sun. 
4 (June 20, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 61192657) (noting "the growing number of adult chil-
dren caring for their parents"). 
70. 482 U.S. 78. 
7l. Id. at 95-96. 
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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reasons that same-sex couples would marry. The state does not require that 
couples be willing or able to have children before they are permitted to 
marry so it is not at all clear why this would be an appropriate reason to 
prevent same-sex couples from marrying even were they not having 
children. 
It seems safe to assume that one of the reasons that some oppose same-
sex marriage is that they believe such unions contravene God's will.73 Yet, 
it may be helpful to remember that the same claim was made about interra-
cial marriage. Indeed, in Loving v. Virginia,74 in which the United States 
Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the Court 
explicitly noted the trial court's suggestion that interracial marriage was 
against God's wil1.75 Presumably, the trial court was representing the sin-
cere views of many Virginians at the time. Sincerity of such views notwith-
standing, an amendment to the United States Constitution removing state 
and federal constitutional protection of the right to marry someone of an-
other race would have been wrong. 
It might be pointed out that only some, rather than all, religions disap-
proved of interracial unions. Yet, the same point might be made about 
same-sex unions. Some traditions recognize such unions while others do 
not,76 and it would be inaccurate·to claim that religions uniformly condemn 
such unions. Just as it would have been wrong to amend the United States 
Constitution to remove federal and state constitutional protection of interra-
cial marriages, it would be wrong to amend the Constitution to remove con-
stitutional protection of same-sex unions. 
It has perhaps been forgotten that one of Virginia's claimed justifica-
tions for its anti-miscegenation statute was that it was interested in promot-
ing the best interests of children-the state sought to prevent "a mongrel 
breed of citizens."77 The State further argued that because the scientific 
evidence was in doubt with respect to whether children produced and raised 
in interracial homes would be the equal of children produced and raised in 
single-race homes, the United States Supreme Court should defer to the 
wisdom of the Virginia Legislature on this matter and permit the State to 
continue to discourage interracial marriage.78 The Court rejected Virginia's 
argument, suggesting that the State's purported justification was really an 
73. Brenda Godsey, Forefathers did not Want Religion to be Part of Law, Kansan.com, (Apr. 
14,2004) (available at http://www.thekansan.com!stories/041404/vie_0414040049.shtml) ("Many 
people believe that same-sex marriage is against God's will."). 
74. 388 u.s. 1. 
75. See id. at 3. 
76. Sandra Cavazos, Harmful to None: Why California Should Recognize Out-of-State Same-
Sex Marriages under Its Current Marital Choice of Law Rule, 9 UCLA Women's L.J. 133, 166 
("several religions now recognize same-sex unions"). 
77. Laving, 388 u.s. at 7. 
78. Id. at 8. 
2004] MARRIAGE, PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 133 
attempt to mask the real reasons for the amendment. 79 Both the Congress 
and the states should reject the claim that the amendment would promote 
the interests of children-the interests of children would be undermined by 
the amendment and so cannot plausibly justify supporting it. 
Some amendment proponents think that it is important for the people 
to be allowed to vote on whether same-sex couples will be permitted to 
marry.80 Yet, Loving illustrates an additional point, namely, that some 
things should not be left up to a popular vote in a constitutional democracy, 
since it is far from clear that Loving would have been ratified had it been 
submitted to a popular referendum in 1967.81 
Indeed, who would be willing to let people vote on whether his mar-
riage should continue to be recognized or whether, instead, he should be 
forced to look for a new (type of) mate? Who would be willing to let the 
public decide that she not be married to her current partner but instead 
should look for someone else who was older or younger or of a different 
religion or race or with a different political perspective, etc.? 
By the same token, who would be willing to subject her parent-child 
relationship to a popular vote, knowing that the voters might suggest that 
the best interests of the child might be promoted were he raised by someone 
else who would give the child a more religious or less religious education, a 
more conservative or a more liberal upbringing, etc.? Presumably, those 
who trumpet the benefits of democracy in this context. might approve of 
others' relationships being subjected to popular ratification but would be 
unwilling to have their own relationships subjected to a similar fate. 
Family rights are simply too important to be left up to a popular vote, 
which is yet another reason that the amendment should not be adopted. 
Thus, there are a number of reasons that it should fail, including that the 
most plausible effect of its enactment would be to undermine rather than 
promote the interests of the hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions of 
children raised by same-sex parents. 
IV. How BROADLY SHOULD THE AMENDMENT BE INTERPRETED? 
It is suggested above that passage of the amendment would not deter 
same-sex couples from having children and that the likely effect on chil-
dren's lives would be to undermine rather than promote their interests. Yet, 
there is a way in which the amendment might have a chilling effect on non-
marital couples having or raising children and detrimentally affect chil-
79. Id. at 11. ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious 
racial discrimination which justifies liis classification."). 
80. See Sekulow, supra n. 42 (should allow states to vote). 
8l. See Andrew Sullivan, Introduction, in Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con xvii, xxi (An-
drew Sullivan ed., Vintage Books 1997) ("In 1968, lie year liat interracial marriage became legal 
across lie United States, a Gallup poll found liat some 72 percent of Americans still disapproved 
of such marriages."). 
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dren's interests in yet another respect. The amendment might be construed 
to limit the constitutional protections afforded to the parental rights of the 
never-married. 
Given the language of and the justification offered for the amendment, 
as well as the context in which it arose,82 it would not be surprising for a 
court to treat the amendment as not only overruling Lawrence v. Texas83 
but, in addition, overruling the line of cases that would include, for exam-
ple, Stanley v. Illinois84 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.85 Basically, the interpreta-
tion of the amendment might be that the family protections that the Court 
has recognized as being part of the right to privacy only apply to married 
individuals. 
Custody and visitation or, more generally, parental rights are viewed 
as paradigmatic incidents of marriage.86 The amendment suggests that 
neither state constitutions nor the federal Constitution can be construed to 
protect the incidents of marriage, e.g., parental and conjugal rights, outside 
the confines of marriage. This might mean that never-married parents, re-
gardless of sexual orientation, would have to rely on legislative rather than 
constitutional protections of their parental rights. By the same token, an 
individual who wished to engage in consensual, non-marital, sexual rela-
tions would be able to do so legally only if the state legislature were willing 
to permit such behavior-no federal or state constitutional provisions 
would protect the relations or even the contraception that individuals might 
wish to use while engaging in such relations. Basically, the privacy rights 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
might have to be reinterpreted to apply to the married but not the never-
married. 
Doubtless, some amendment supporters would support the proposed 
amendment even more once those possible ramifications became clear. 
Those who believe it important for children to be raised in homes by a 
husband and wife might welcome the removal of state and federal constitu-
tional protections of families who do not mirror their preferred paradigm. 
They might even note that the amendment would facilitate adoptions, be-
cause single parents unwilling to surrender their children to be raised in 
two-parent homes could not rely on state or federal constitutional guaran-
tees to protect their parent-child relationships. Either single parents would 
82. Here, the context refers to the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), rather than the amendment being promoted by a President who was in the midst of a hotly 
contested campaign during an increasingly unpopular war. 
83. 539 U.S. 558. 
84. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (striking the Illinois presumption that unwed fathers are unfit 
parents). 
85. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking Massachusetts law preventing distribution of contracep-
tives to the unmarried). 
86. See e.g. Lumbra, 394 A.2d at 1142 (suggesting that custody is one of the incidents of 
marriage). 
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have to marry or they might risk losing their children to others who would 
provide a setting in which there was a mother and a father. 
Amendment opponents would presumably suggest that presenting sin-
gle parents or LGBT parents with the choice of marrying or of possibly 
losing their children might lead to many unhappy marriages with an in-
creased incidence of adultery, as former Governor McGreevey has so pub-
licly illustrated,87 or perhaps to an increase in domestic violence because 
victims might fear that they might lose their children unless they stayed 
with or even married their abusers.88 
The removal of constitutional protection of the privacy rights of the 
unmarried could have disastrous effects on nontraditional families. Over-
zealous legislators might decide that it would be better for children to be 
raised by a husband and wife, even if that would mean taking children out 
of loving single-parent or nontraditional dual-parent homes and putting 
them into the homes of strangers. Regrettably, the fact that children's inter-
ests and well-being might be undermined in yet another way were the 
amendment adopted will likely not sway some amendment proponents, as is 
made clear when one considers the support for an amendment that, even 
narrowly interpreted, might adversely affect the lives of hundreds of 
thousands or millions of children. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Marriage Amendment is much less clear than proponents 
suggest. Most of the focus of the debate has been on preventing the recog-
nition of same-sex marriages. However, by precluding constitutional pro-
tection of the incidents of marriage for those who are unmarried, the 
amendment has the potential to subject extremely important aspects of pri-
vate life to the whims of legislatures. 
What would legislatures do if freed from the limitations imposed by 
state and federal constitutional guarantees? That is unclear. Some legisla-
tures would likely offer statutory protections of all of those interests no 
longer constitutionally protected, assuming that the amendment would per-
mit such legislation to be passed and enforced. Other legislatures would 
likely take the opportunity to re-enact legislation: (1) limiting or prohibiting 
access to contraception for the unmarried; (2) proscribing adult, voluntary 
non-marital relations; and (3) undermining the parental rights of the unmar-
ried. In short, some legislatures would take this opportunity to return to the 
laws of a bygone era. 
87. Stevenson Swanson, New Jersey Governor to Quit over Gay Affair, Chic. Trib. (Aug. 13, 
2004) (available at 2004 WL 89473131). 
88. Cf Leslye E. Orloff, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant 
Women; A History of Legislative Responses, 10 Am. D.l. Gender Soc. Policy & L. 95, 123 (2001) 
("Research has found that more than half of battered women report that they stay with their abus-
ers because they did not feel they could support themselves and their children if they left."). 
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If adopted, the FMA could have devastating effects on nontraditional 
families generally and on children in particular. It could lead to an in-
creased balkanization of the states and increased divisiveness within the 
states. In either of its versions, the FMA is the kind of amendment that 
should never have been proposed and certainly should not be adopted. The 
interests that would be detrimentally affected by it are simply too important 
to be made subject to legislative whim. 
